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CASE COMMENTS
United States v. Robinson1
N APRIL 19, 1968, WILLIE ROBINSON was stopped by a District of
Columbia policeman, Officer Jenks, who was conducting a routine
automobile spot check. The officer examined Robinson's temporary
operator's permit, automobile registration and selective service classification card. Although noting a discrepancy between the date of birth
specified on two of the documents, 2 the officer nonetheless allowed the
respondent to proceed. Subsequently, Jenks checked the discrepancy
through police traffic records' and determined that Robinson was
probably operating a motor vehicle illegally, following the revocation
of his driver's permit.
Four days later, upon observing Robinson operating the same
motor vehicle as previously noted, Jenks stopped Robinson and, when
presented with the same driver's permit, arrested him for operating
a motor vehicle after revocation of his license. 4 Such an offense was
punishable in the District of Columbia by a mandatory minimum jail
term, a mandatory fine, or both,5 and required the arresting officer to
make a custodial arrest.6 Having been instructed to conduct a full
field search when making a custodial arrest, the officer searched
Robinson's person. In so doing, Officer Jenks removed a wadded up
cigarette package from Robinson's jacket pocket which, upon further
examination, yielded fourteen capsules of heroin.
U.S .....94 S.Ct. 467 (1973).
at ---- 94 S.Ct. at 470. Respondent's operator's permit listed his date of birth as 1938
while his selective service registration card specified 1927.
3 Id. at ---- 94 S.Ct. at 470. The records search indicated that the operator's permit of a Willie
Robinson, Jr., born in 1927, had been revoked. However, a temporary permit was subsequently issued to a Willie Robinson whose date of birth was listed as 1938. Respondent's
photograph appeared on both the revoked permit and the temporary permit.
4 Id. at ......
94 S.Ct. at 470. Respondent was specifically arrested for "operating after revocation and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation."
5
D.C. CODE ANN. §40-32 (d) (1967), which provides in part that:
Any individual found guilty of operating a motor vehicle in the District during
the period for which his operator's permit is revoked or suspended under this
chapter shall, for each such offense, be fined not less than $100 nor more than
$500, or imprisoned not less than 30 days nor more than one year, or both.
'.

2 Id.

'Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, United States v. Robinson, -_ U.S... 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973),
citing District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department General Order No. 3, Series
1959 (April 24, 1959), which provides in pertinent part that:
The use of Traffic Violation Notices is a courtesy of long standing and shall
be employed whenever possible, consistent with the overall safety of the public.
Only in the more serious or aggravated types of traffic violations, those which
indicate a serious disregard for the safety of others, or those in which the officer
has reasonable grounds to believe that the individuals concerned will, in all probability, ignore the Traffic Violation Notices, should it be necessary to make summary arrest. These include, but are not confined to: "Fleeing from the Scene of an
Accident;" "Driving under the influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Narcotic
(Continued on next page)
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Robinson was convicted for possession and concealment of heroin

in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and held that
the heroin, which was introduced into evidence, had been seized during an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amendment.6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' and, on December 11, 1973, rendered a decision which reversed the Court of Appeals
and holds that:
In the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the

person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search

under that Amendment.10
Decided the same day by the Court was the case of Gustafson v.
Florida," wherein the petitioner sought the review of his state court

conviction for the unlawful possession of marihuana.12 At trial, the
prosecution had introduced as evidence marihuana which had been
found in a cigarette box on the petitioner's person during a patdown
search after his arrest.13 The U.S. Supreme Court relied on their decision in United States v. Robinson, 4 and held that:
(Continued from preceding page)
Drugs;" "Reckless Driving;" "Operating Without a Permit;" "Operating After
Suspension or Revocation of Operator'sPermit;" "Excessive Speed Cases" indicating an absolute disregard for the safety of others and any other violations where
the officer, after having checked with traffic records, ascertains that the operator is
frequently changing his place of residence or employment. In these types of cases
and in the interest of public safety, it is not appropriate to permit the offending
motorists to continue on to their destinations and summary arrests should be made.
Summary arrests should also be made for traffic violations when it is known
beforehand that there are accumulated against the operator of the vehicle outstanding tickets or warrants which have been ignored, when the operator has been
avoiding services of a suspension or revocation notice or when it is known or suspected that he is wanted for a felony or other serious infraction of the law.
Except as provided in the two preceding paragraphs, whenever the operator
of a vehicle is able to produce valid or prima facie credentials as to his or her
identity and either lives or works in the District of Columbia, the officer shall issue
a Traffic Violation Notice. [emphasis added.]
7....U.S. at ------94 S.Ct. at 469; 26 U.S.C. §4704(a) (1964) prohibits the possession of
narcotic drugs and 21 U.S.C. §174 (1964) prohibits the receipt and concealment of same.
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cit. 1972). Respondent's first appearance
in the United States Court of Appeals resulted in the case being remanded to the district
court; United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1971). From an adverse decision on remand, respondent again appealed at which time his conviction was reversed.
9
United states v. Robinson. 410 U.S. 982 (1973).
10____U.S. at ------94 S. Ct. at 477.
11 ----U.S ,94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
12
Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1971), rev'd 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1972), cert. granted, 410 U.S. 9R2 (1973).
13 ....
U.S. at-----, 94 S.Ct. at 488. Petitioners automobile had been observed weaving back
and forth across the centerline of a highway. A police officer stopped the vehicle and requested that the petitioner produce his driver's license. Petitioner did not have the license on
his person, and pursuant to FLA. STAT. ANN. §322.15 (1968), petitioner was arrested for
failure to have the driver's license in his possession. The arresting officer then decided to take
petitioner into custody and consequently conducted a pat down search after which the officer
confiscatea a cigarette box from petitioner's coat which was found to contain marihuana
cigarettes.
14......
U.S...... 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
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The full search of the person of the suspect made incident to
a lawful custodial arrest did not violate the Fourth and Four15

teenth Amendments.

Thus, in two companion cases, the Court directly addressed itself
to the issue of the permissible scope of the search of a person incident
to a valid custodial arrest,16 and resolved the question concerning the
applicability of the Terry v. Ohio17 "frisk" standards to a custodial

arrest situation.
Background

Since the Supreme Court first announced that the fourth amendment barred the admission of evidence obtained through an illegal

search and seizure,16 the question of what constitutes an "unreasonable" search has been frequently litigated. 19 Law enforcement ad-

vocates have traditionally argued that the need to protect police officers and the need to discover the fruits and instrumentalities of
crime 20 should justify a relatively extensive search. Defense attorneys,
however, have argued that searches should be limited and that probable
cause 21 to make a search must exist prior to the seizure of evidence
22
which would subsequently be used by the prosecution at trial.
In an effort to establish search guidelines, the Supreme Court held
in Terry v. Ohiou that a patdown "frisk" for weapons could be conducted in a situation where no probable cause to arrest existed. Upon
balancing the need of the police officer to protect himself from injury
against the constitutional right of an individual to be free from unreasonable searches, the court concluded that, under the particular24
circumstances of that case, the officer's actions were "reasonable.

Although the Court in Terry did not explicitly state that this balancing test of reasonableness was to apply to searches where probable
U.S...
15Gustafson v. Florida,......

94 S. Ct. 488, 489 (1973).

16The validity of the arrest was conceded in both cases. United States v. Robinson - .... U.S.
94 S.Ct. 488 n. 1
94 S. Ct. 488 n. 1 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, ____ U.S .......
-----(1973).
17392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), which enunciated the exclusionary rule as
applied in Federal courts, and Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), extending the application of the same rule to state courts.
19See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1960); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20
See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964), which defines the legitimate objectives of an arrest-based search as being the protection of the arresting officer and the prevention of the destruction of the fruits, instrumentalities and other evidence of the crime for
which an arrest is made.
21See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), for discussion of probable cause.
2 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
23392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2Id. at 23-4.
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cause to arrest did exist, the following language of the court seemed
to imply such an interpretation. "The scope of the search must be
'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which render its
initiation permissible."2 5 Likewise, prior to the statement that a search
incident to an arrest ". . . can . . . involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person," 26 the Court took notice that even a
.. . search which is reasonable at its inception [as in the
case of a search incident to an arrest] may violate the
Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and
scope.27
Thus, through dicta, the Terry Court clearly seemed to reiterate its
balancing test of reasonableness when considering the permissible
extent of a search incident to an arrest. The Court's adherence to
this position is further evidenced by its discussion of the rationale
underlying the exclusionary rule. After noting that ". . . limitations
upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself,"2 the
Court specifically attempted to insure that it was not giving its consent to any type of "frisk" that an officer might conduct by stating
that:
evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by
...
means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation."
However, the Court in Terry did not define the limitations which
were to result from the fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches. Instead, the development of a definition extending the amendment's restrictions was left to the future ". . . concrete
factual circumstances of individual cases. ' 3 Consequently, in the
companion case to Terry, Sibron v. New York, 31 the Court determined
that by reaching into the suspect's pocket and removing envelopes containing heroin, the officer went beyond the permissible scope of a
"protective" search which was found justifiable in Terry.32
During the term of Court following Terry, the Supreme Court,
in Chimel v. California,3 reviewed and revised the standards pertaining to a warrantless search of an arrestee's premises incident to a

at 19.
at 25.
2Id. at 18.

25ld.
6Id.

2Id. at 29.
29

d.

30Id.

31392 U.S. 40 (1968).
32Id. at 65.
3

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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lawful arrest. In Chimel, the court recognized that the reasons which
justified a search of the person incident to an arrest, namely the protection of the arresting officer and the prevention of the destruction
of evidence, did not operate to justify a search of any rooms other
than the one in which the arrest occurred. 34 The Court thus proceeded to draw a physical zone around the arrested party beyond
which a valid search could not extend. 35 However, in focusing upon
the zone theory to define fourth amendment reasonableness, the Court
did not determine exact standards to govern the permissible intensity
of a search within the area of the arrestee's control. The only reference to this question seemed to imply that nearly any search of the
person would be deemed reasonable.
[I] t is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or to effect his escape....
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 36
It should be noted, however, that when read within the context of
the entire opinion, it is difficult to determine if this statement from
Chimel merely restated the justification allowing a search incident
to an arrest or was meant to define the permissible extent of such
searches.
Thus, Terry and Chimel demonstrate that prior to Robinson, the
Court had recognized two exceptions to the fourth amendment requirement that searches be based upon warrants issued upon probable
cause: 1) where the search was necessary due to "exigent circumstances," and 2) where the search was incident to a lawful arrest.
However, in the situation wherein a search was incident to an arrest,
the Court had not actually defined the permissible scope of the search
of a person who was within the zone of "control" defined by the test
of Chimel. Furthermore, since the Terry limitations had been formulated in a non-arrest situation, it was conceivable that a different
test was to be applied "[o] nce the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physical dominion of the law. . . -37 The question left
undetermined by both Terry and Chimel, therefore, was whether
"reasonableness" meant that there needed to be cause to believe in
the existence of evidence to be found by a search incident to a lawful
arrest, or whether the arrest itself would permit an unlimited search
to be reasonable per se.
3

35
36

Id. at 763. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).

Id.

31Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1960).
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Lower court cases which had decided this issue reflect the confusion which existed prior to the Robinson decision. In the courts of
California alone, almost completely opposing philosophies had been
expounded. In Morel v. Superior Court,3 a defendant who had engaged
in a speed contest was arrested for "safety reasons." Although noting
that the decision to arrest the defendant was totally within the officer's discretion, the court nonetheless upheld a subsequent search
of the defendant's pockets as valid since it was incident to the lawful
arrest. In Morel, the officer testified that during a frisk of the defendant he felt something hard which ".

.

. could probably have been

a weapon"3 9 and thus, the court's ultimate rationale in upholding
the search was based upon the officer's need to protect himself. However, the state's interest in preventing the destruction of contraband
during transportation to jail was also specifically referred to by the
court. 40 From the language used,41 it is clear that the Morel court would

not require the prior existence of probable cause to search for contraband in order to uphold the validity of such an evidentiary search.
Although the Morel decision, permitting any search of the arrestee's person, has been effectively limited by the California Supreme
Court in People v. Superior Court [hereinafter cited as Simon],42
it nevertheless demonstrates the type of conflict which existed. In
Simon, contrary reasoning was applied based on the Terry concept of
limiting the scope of a search to the particular facts of each case.
Thus, the court in Simon concluded that a warrantless search of the
driver for both "weapons" and "contraband"
...must be predicated in traffic violation cases on specific
acts or circumstances giving the officer reasonable grounds
to believe that [they] are present in the vehicle he has
stopped.4
Furthermore, with regard to the permissibility of a search for weapons, the court specifically referred to its probable cause limitation by
stating that:
...the physical risk to the officer is created by the circumstances of the confrontation taken as a whole, not by the
technical niceties of the law of arrest. 4
10 Cal. App.3d 913, 89 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970).
39Id. at 915, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.

40Id. at 918, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 300-01.
41Id. at 919, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 301, citing Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 388-89 (9th
Cir. 1960). The full text of the Charles quote appears at text accompanying note 47, infira.
42 7 Cal.3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972) (en banc).
43Id. at 206, 496 P.2d at 1219, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 851, citing People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d
807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
4 People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 186, 204, 496 P.2d 1205, 1218, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 850
(1972).
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It should be noted that the Simon court determined that the search
was to be limited to facts which would give cause to believe that
contraband existed in spite of the fact that the defendant had been
arrested for failing to produce his automobile registration, an offense
for which it was mandatory that the accused be taken into custody. 45
Although the Simon decision resolved the conflict as it existed in
California, opposing views existed in other jurisdictions. In Charles
v. United States, 46 for example, the defendant was arrested at his
home, upon warrants, for threatening assault and battery. He was
frisked at the time of the arrest and found to be unarmed. However,
a short time later one of the arresting officers told the defendant to
empty his pockets which resulted in marihuana being placed in view.
In affirming the defendant's conviction for possession of narcotics,
the court held that the second search of the defendant's person was
lawful and permissible under the fourth amendment. While noting
that the search was for the purpose of uncovering evidence of a
crime other than that for which the defendant was charged, the court
nonetheless concluded that:
[t] o say that the police may curtail the liberty of the accused
but refrain from impinging upon the sanctity of his pockets
except for enumerated reasons is to ignore the custodial
duties which devolve upon the arresting authorities . . .
Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to the
physical domain of the law, inspection of his person, regardless of purpose, cannot be deemed wrongful. 47

In State v. Curtis,4 8 a contrary result was reached by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, and the search was found to be unreasonable
under a rationale similar to that of the California Supreme Court in
Simon. In Curtis, the defendant, who was stopped for failing to signal
a turn, was observed throwing something on the front seat as he
alighted from his automobile. During a routine search of his person,
which the officers attempted to justify by the fact that they were
about to put him into their squad car, the police felt the outside of
the defendant's pocket and detected something which they later
admitted did not feel like a weapon. As the officer was reaching into
the defendant's pocket, the latter snatched a package therefrom and
dumped its contents. They were later identified as marihuana.
After citing Terry v. Ohio49 as a basis upon which a reasonable
search for weapons could have been conducted, the court in Curtis
45

CAL. VEH. CODE

§40302 (West Supp. 1973).

46278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960.)
47

1Id. at 388-89.

4290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971).

09391 U.S. 1 (1968).
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stated that there were no facts in the instant case from which the
police could have inferred that the defendant had a weapon; consequently, there was no reason to conduct a search.5 While noting the
concern for safety in face-to-face confrontation,51 and recognizing the
52
officer's right to search a person prior to placing him in a squad car,
the court nevertheless stated that the police must have a valid reason
for placing an offender in the squad car before the search conducted
would be justified.5 3 The fact that the defendant scattered the contraband did not cause the seizure to come within the "plain view" exception 54 since the ". . . defendant's attempt to dispose of the evidence
did not precede but followed efforts of the police to conduct an unlawful search. 55s Likewise the fact that the police observed the defendant throw an object on the front seat did not validate the search
even though this object later proved to be a weapon. With respect to
this point, the court states that the ". . . subsequently discovered facts
cannot retroactively serve to validate a search which was otherwise
56
unlawful."
Robinson: The Reasoning of the Court
The dissenters characterized the majority's conclusion as a "disingenuous" application of existing precedent.5 7 Such a criticism,
standing alone, may be superficial. It is true that there are opinions
58
by lower courts which support the majority's conclusion. The fact
that the majority did not mention these cases in supporting its position demonstrates that the underlying rationale is broader in scope
than these decisions. Accordingly, the reader must look to sources
other than the opinions and cases cited therein in order to fully comprehend the impact of the Robinson decision.
A brief review of Burger Court decisions reveals that the majority justices have announced that they are equipped with some basic
underlying presumptions and principles. In the criminal law area particularly, the Burger Court's majority has consistently favored the

s State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429,436, 190 N.W.2d 631, 636 (1971). See also People v. Marsh,
20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967).
s State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 436, 190 N.W.2d 631, 636 (1971).
52

Id. at 437, 190 N.W.2d at 636.

53

Id.

' 4See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971), and the cases cited therein for
a general discussion of the "plain view" doctrine.
55 State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 437, 190 N.W.2d 631, 636 (1971).
56

Id.

U.S . ,94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
s7United States v. Robinson -.....
s Id. at 494 n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring), citing Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 388-9
(1960). See also United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Mills, 7 CR. L. 2503 (D.C. Cir. 1970); State v. Henneke, 78 Wash.2d 147, 470 P.2d 176

1970); Annot., 169 A.L.R. 1419 (1947).
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position of the prosecutor and police under the pretext of affording
protection to the average law-abiding citizen"9 (as opposed to the
criminal accused) from such social undesirables as murderers, rapists,
and drug pushers. Thus, split jury verdicts in state criminal trials
have been upheld ;60 a first amendment privilege to withhold facts
relevant to a grand jury investigation of crime was not extended to
newspapermen ;61 the protection afforded the criminal accused from
lineups conducted without the presence of counsel was held inapplicable to identification procedures prior to indictment ;62 the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination was diluted by allowing
coerced self-incriminating testimony in grand jury investigations
where statutory provisions provide "use and derivative use" immunity
to the witness, 3 even where the purported immunity was based solely
on the government's good faith application of the statute; and statements made by a criminal accused which were inadmissible under
the Miranda standards, were utilized for certain limited purposes
where such statements were not coerced or involuntarily given." Such
decisions give rise to the following observations:
While attempting to favor the prosecutor and police, substantial emphasis is placed upon the assumption that the
police will conduct themselves in an orderly, lawful, and
reasonable manner, and within constitutional bounds when
carrying out their official functions ;65

Technicalities should not be available to the accused criminal
as a tool for the commission of crime or a defense for avoiding prosecution ;66
Society's interest in being afforded protection from criminals
as well as a public interest in insuring that guilty parties

59

J. SIMON, IN HIS OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD NIXON'S AMERICA

253

(1973).
60Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
61 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
6

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
65
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting), where the
Court's conclusion effectively made the rights afforded to individuals under the fifth amendment dependent almost exclusively upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecutor and
law enforcement officials.
6 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971), where the Court specifically stated that:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit
perjury.
6
6
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will be prosecuted and punished should enjoy a fundamental
position among the constitutional hierarchy of protected
67

rights.

In the area of searches, a 1972 case1 indicated that the Burger
Court was already living up to its law and order reputation by extending the authority of the police to conduct Terry-type weapon
69
frisks to include situations wherein narcotics were found, as well.
The Robinson and Gustafson holdings must therefore be evaluated as
an additional manifestation by the Burger Court of its law and order
70
philosophy.
1
dealt with the permissible
While the case of Adams v. Williams"
extent of a search in a non-arrest situation, Robinson discusses the
extent to which a search of the person may be conducted when incident to a valid custodial arrest. The Court starts from the proposition
that the validity of the arrest in each case gives rise to the finding
that the police officer's manner of conducting the search was reasonable. 72 In fact, the conduct of the arresting officer in effecting the
arrest was not even questioned.7 3 The Court apparently placed special
emphasis on this factor 74 as it tended to reaffirm its conviction that
the police and governmental officials will act reasonably and within
constitutional mandates while carrying out their duties. Since valid
custody over the person of the accused is effected by virtue of the
arrest, the privacy protection afforded by the fourth amendment is
substantially subordinated to the overriding societal and governmental
interests of protecting the police officer, the effective detention of
arrested persons, the prosecution of persons engaged in the commission of crime, and the protection of other innocent members of society.75
67

See SIMON, supra note 59, at 252-75, for a discussion of the "law and order" philosophy as
espoused by the majority of the Burger Court.
6 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
69It is particularly noteworthy that in its decision whereby the "stop-and-frisk" may be employed for the sole purpose of conducting a protective search for weapons, the Court in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), impliedly placed the so called "narcotics limitation" upon
the street encounter of a suspect by a law enforcement officer.
70Prior to its decision in the Robinson case, the predisposition of the Burger Court toward the
"law and order" philosophy led one commentator to predict that the Supreme Court would
reject the rationale of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals that the search of
Robinson's person was violative of the Fourth Amendment. Note, Restricting the Scope of
Searches Incident to Arrest: United States v. Robinson, 59 VA. L. REV. 724, 748 (1973).
71407 U.S. 143 (1972).
72 It was stipulated in the briefs submitted by both Robinson and Gustafson that the standard
of reasonableness required by the fourth amendment regarding the authority of the police
officers to take both defendants into custody on the basis of minor traffic offenses had been
94 S. Ct. 467
U.S -.....
met. Brief for Respondent at 5, United States v. Robinson -.....
, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
1973) Brief for Petitioner at 9, Gustafson v. Florida, ---- U.S.
94 S. Ct. 467, 470 (1973).
See Gustafson v. Florida - ----U.S_ -_ , 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973) (Stewart & Powell, JJ., concurring at 492 and 494, respectively); United States v. Robinson, -----U.S ...... , 94 S. Ct.
467, 494 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).

73Id.; United States v. Robinson, ____ U.S. _,
74
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Robinson, argues
that while most of the case law concerning limitations upon searches
and seizures has developed since Weeks v. United States, 76 the validity
of searches incident to a lawful arrest has generally been constitutionally recognized as a matter of historical precedent. 77 The limitations imposed by the post-Weeks cases applies to the scope of the
arrest-search concerning the area within the control of the arrestee.7 8
Where a search of the arrestee's person is in question, the majority found no difficulty in distinguishing searches incident to arrest
from the Terry-type frisk. 79 Because an arrest based on probable cause
is wholly different from a limited weapons search in the nature of its
intrusion upon individual freedom, and since the interest each is
designed to serve is also different, argues Justice Rehnquist, the Terry
decision affords no authority to apply the limitations on a stop and
frisk search to a full-custody, probable cause arrest situation. 80 While
the dissent might have found this distinction a fruitful area of attack,
it should be noted that the Burger Court majority has, on occasion,
tended to rely heavily upon such seemingly meaningless distinctions
to justify the making of substantial inroads into rights of the criminal accused which were so easily accorded by their Warren Court
predecessors. 81 Moreover, in making the distinction between custodial
arrests and the non-arrest stop, much emphasis was placed upon the
increased danger to the officer which necessarily follows when taking
a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station. In
balancing the comparative risks involved - i.e., the technically minor
intrusion upon the arrestee's person as opposed to the increased danger
to the police officer - the Burger Court majority has consistently
favored protection of the police in carrying out their law enforcement
functions. Justice Rehnquist's conclusion convincingly indicates that
while the limits of the search in a non-arrest situation are prescribed
by the justification to conduct it, the same limits are not applicable to
the arrest-search, which is governed by a completely different set
of principles.

76232 U.S. 383 (1914).
77
U.S. at -----, 94 S. Ct. at 471-72, citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925);
see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
___ U.S. at-_, 94 S. Ct. at 472, citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
79-- -U.S. at -----, 94 S. Ct. at 473.
80
Id. at ----945 S. Ct. at 474, where the Court followed the dicta in the concurring opinion
of Harlan, J., in the case of Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 66 (1968), by stating that:
[w~e do not believe that the Court in Peters intended in one unexplained and unelaborated sentence to impose a novel and far reaching limitation on the authority
to search the person of an arrestee incident to his lawful arrest.
81See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), wherein the Court found the distinction
between a pre-indictment lineup on one hand, and a post-indictment lineup on the other,
substantial enough so as to preclude the necessity of counsel at the former, while recognizing
the necessity of counsel's presence at the latter.
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While the dissenters attack the majority's distinction between an
arrest and a non-arrest stop on the basis that both situations are
governed by substantially the same justifications, they concede that
some of the differences may in some instances require a more thorough
search. In these instances, argue the dissent, a balancing test must
be interposed in order to insure that individual rights remain free
from unnecessarily intrusive invasions of privacy. The test suggested
by the dissent is that a more extensive search should be allowed only
where the officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with a dangerous individual, such reasonable belief being a matter of judicial determination. This argument was not convincing to the majority justices
who sought to more efficiently facilitate the implementation of the law
by providing distinct guidelines for enforcement officials to follow.
Thus, the majority is not content to hold simply that there is no
authority which requires the application of Terry limitations to the
arrest-search situation. By conveniently dispensing with the case-bycase determination of probable cause, Justice Rehnquist finds additional justification to allow a search by giving credence to the arresting officer's ad hoc determination in deciding to conduct a full search
as well as how and where to do it. The authority to conduct the search
of the arrestee's person, argues the court, ". . . does not depend upon
what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect." 82 Such a holding operates to shift the burden
of proving the reasonableness of each step of the search from the arresting officer to the arrestee by requiring a showing that the manner
83
of conducting the search was clearly unreasonable, or that the arrest
itself was pretextual or without probable cause. This result is in
accord with the Burger Court majority's willingness to presume that
the police and local officials will act reasonably in carrying out their
official duties. While the dissent argue that the traditional case-bycase judicial determination of reasonableness should not be lightly
dispensed with,8 4 because such would be contrary to the framers'
intent in drafting the fourth amendment, little attention is given to
questioning the factual basis by which the majority arrived at their
underlying presumptions. In light of such failure by the dissent, the
majority's conclusion that the conduct of the police is reasonable,

82

83

94 S. Ct. at 477.
..... U.S. at -----Id., wherein the Court stated that:
... the search partook of none of the extreme or patently abusive characteristics
which were held to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 . . . (1952).
, 94 S. Ct. at 486; the determination by a magistrate as to whether or not a
U.S. at .--search warrant is to be issued protects individuals from ad hoc determinations of the police;
the dissent recognizes this consideration as being essential when it states that: "[ilt is the
role of the judiciary, not of the police officers, to delimit the scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement."

8.--
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appears to satisfy constitutional requirements. That is, since the
search of the arrestee's person arising out of a valid arrest is automatically reasonable, the police officer's discovery of contraband
entitled him to effect seizure as evidence "probative of criminal
5
conduct."s
Additional Points of the Dissent
The dissent in Robinson finds the Court's current trend of balancing fourth amendment rights with the government's competing interest in the prevention and detection of crime as being a dangerous
assault on personal freedom, in arguments which are either overlooked or simply dismissed without discussion by the majority.
Among the dangers considered by the dissent is the question of
potential police abuse. 6 Justice Marshall is specifically concerned about
the possibility that future traffic arrests will be used as a mere pretext
to conduct a search of the person where no other grounds for such a
search are available.8 7 The difficulty here is that even though searches
incident to such invalid arrests are not within the Robinson authorization," the arrestee nevertheless bears the burden of proof which
may in practice be physically impossible to meet.
The shadow cast on the spirit and intent of the fourth amendment also troubles the dissenters. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
historically noted dissent in Harris v. United States8 9 indicated that:
• . . we are dealing with a provision of the Constitution
which sought to guard against an abuse that more than any
one single factor gave rise to American independence.90 .
On another occasion,91 Justice Frankfurter stated that the fourth
amendment
. .was the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the
evils of searches without warrants and searches with warrants unrestricted in scope. 2
*

Such language appears to have convinced the dissenters that the fourth
amendment was designed by the framers to interpose a neutral magistrate or some other judicial officer between the citizen and the police
85

Id. at 477.

" Id.at 482.

Id.

87

88In Robinson, the Court pointed out that the search in question "partook of none of the exextreme or patently abusive characteristics" violative of the Due Process Clause of the Four___.
U.S. at ------94 S. Ct. at 477.
teenth Amendment
89331 U.S. 145 (1947).
90

1d. at 159.

91United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
92

Id.at 70.
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so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade the privacy
of the person or his home in order to enforce the law.93 With few exceptions, courts have jealously guarded fourth amendment rights and
have followed the wisdom of Justice Bradley's admonition in Boyd v.
United States, 94 where he warned that:
...
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure ....
A close and literal construction deprives [Constitutional Provisions] of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
95
consisted more in sound than in substance.

This language properly characterizes the fears of the Robinson dissent. While the question of whether this concern is justified in a matter
of personal judgment, due cognizance of these possibilities must be
taken if the public is at all interested in protecting innocent citizens
from unlawful conduct by police, or whether anti-crime concerns will
center about the activities of the more "traditional" criminals.
The dissent views the majority's analysis of an arrest-search as
"oversimplified" and formulated to aid police officers in making ad
hoc decisions in the streets.96 Accordingly, the minority justices focus
their attention to three distinct factual phases of the search in Robinson: the patdown of the respondent, 97 the removal of an "unknown
object" from his pocket,98 and the search of the cigarette package.99
Through such a phased analysis, the minority seeks to advance the
long-standing policy of the court to limit the scope and intensity of
a search to the purpose for which it was initiated 00°
The right of an officer to make a protective search for weapons
under the terms and limitations set forth in Terry v. Ohio'01 is not
questioned by the minority. Thus, to the extent the search in Robinson
02
conformed to Terry, the dissent considers it reasonable.

94 S. Ct. at 479-80, citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403, U.S. 443,
449 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-67 (1968); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
......
-3
U.S. at____..

94116 U.S. 616 (1885).
9

Id. at 635.

96
9Id.

U.S. at ------94 S. Ct. at 479. (Marshall, J., Dissenting).
at 483.

"Id. at 484-86.
99Id. at 486-88.
100ld. at 483, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
101392 U.S. 1 (1968).
102---- U.S. at -----94 S. Ct. at 483 (Marshall, J., Dissenting).
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In the second phase of its analysis, the minority finds the removal
of the unknown object from the arrestee's person to be objectionable.
103
After restating the basic functions for a search incident to an arrest,
the dissent reasons that since Robinson had been arrested for a traffic
violation and since there were no probable fruits of such a crime, the
search was justified solely on the basis that it was a protective search
for weapons.'0 Accordingly, the rationale and limitations of Terry
are deemed applicable. Upon noting that the officer's conduct violated
such standards, the dissent states that:
... the question arises whether it is reasonable for a police
officer, when effecting an in-custody arrest of a traffic offender, to make a fuller search of the person than is permitted pursuant to Terry.05
The dissent does not specifically answer this question, 06 but nonetheless asserts that the search was unreasonable. 07 It is then argued
that even if the search had been reasonable up to this phase, the inspection of the contents of the cigarette package was beyond the
scope of any legitimate interest in conducting a protective search for
weapons. There was no reason to believe that the cigarette pack contained dangerous instruments and, in any event, the package no longer
threatened the officer since it had been removed from the arrestee's
control.'
Conclusion
The dilemma which has troubled many commentators'0 9 is now
settled, and the balance ". . . between the personal privacy of the
arrestee and the physical security of the arresting officer"110 has been
struck. The appropriateness of such a balance, however, is not absolute; several avenues of attack do exist.
Robinson and Gustafson did not change the law of arrest, and
probable cause is therefore still an essential prerequisite to a valid
arrest. Accordingly, because "[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest

103

Id. at 484, citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
at ------94 S. Ct. at 484.

104---- U.S.

1

05

Id.

16

Id at 484-86.

107 Id. at

486.

" Id. at 486-87.
109 Bennett, Judicial Intergrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of
the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129 (1973); Kenny, The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in California,24 STAN. L. REV. 947 (1972); Comment, Simpson v. United States,
453 F.2d 1028 (10th Cit. 1972), 50 J. URBAN L. 149 (1972); Comment, Hall v. United
States, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 595 (1972).
110Note, Restrictingthe Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest: United States v. Robinson, 59 VA.
L. REV. 724, 748 (1973).
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which establishes the authority to search .... ,M defense counsel can
challenge custodial arrests as being pretextual in nature or made in
the absence of probable cause. Additionally, in the absence of local
regulations specifying mandatory custodial offenses, an equal protection argument exists. The power of local officials to choose between
issuing a summons as opposed to effecting custodial arrests may be
unreasonably arbitrary or shown to have been arbitrarily or discriminatorily applied)' 2 Finally, even though an arrest be valid, the
search incident thereto may violate the due process clause if it consists of ".... extreme or patently abusive characteristics .... ,,1 such
114
shock the conscience."
as would "...
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